Blar i forfatter "Kundu, Tapas"

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    • Competitive balance: Information disclosure and discrimination in an asymmetric contest 

      Clark, Derek John; Kundu, Tapas (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2021-02-14)
      We study a design problem for an effort-maximizing principal in a two-player contest with two dimensions of asymmetry. Players have different skill levels and an information gap exists, as only one player knows the skill difference. The principal has two policy instruments to redress the lack of competitive balance due to asymmetry; she can commit to an information-disclosing mechanism, and she can ...

    • Mobility and Conflict 

      Kundu, Tapas; Bhattacharya, Sourav; Deb, Joyee (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2015-02)
      We study the role of intergroup mobility in the emergence of conflict. Two groups compete for the right to allocate society's resources. We allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, which the opposition can accept or reject, and wage conflict. Agents can also switch group membership. Expropriating a large share of resources increases political strength by attracting ...

    • On rational forward-looking behavior in economic geography: An experimental analysis 

      Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; Kundu, Tapas; Østbye, Stein (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2021-02-05)
      This paper adapts the canonical New Economic Geography model for experimental testing of the model's behavioral assumptions by developing a finite-player, finite-horizon dynamic game of migration. Our analysis gives distinctive predictions when migration is consistent with myopic behavior (MB) and when it is consistent with sequentially rational or perfect forward-looking behavior (FB). These ...

    • Partial information disclosure in a contest 

      Clark, Derek John; Kundu, Tapas (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2021-05-18)
      Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts in the contest, based upon active contest participation by all types of the informed player. We allow some ...

    • Resistance, redistribution and investor-friendliness 

      Bhattacharya, Sourav; Kundu, Tapas (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2014)